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negate the intent requisite for delictual liability. Rather, it would
have been sufficient to determine that insanity may negate intent in
regard to insurance liability.
Ultimately, the von Dameck decision allocates the risk of
damages inflicted by an insane homeowner to the group of holders
of homeowners' insurance policies, since they must eventually bear
the cost in the form of higher premiums. While this allocation of risk
is consonant with the fundamental aim of insurance," it also serves
as a guarantee to purchasers of homeowners' insurance that their
liability coverage will not be excluded by a clause not designed to
apply to the rare case of insanity. Since the peculiar facts of this
case are not likely to be repeated, the risk placed upon insurers is
not a formidable one. The underlying reason for the decision may be
simply the court's belief that neither the insurer nor the insured
contemplate an exclusion of coverage when damage is caused by the
act of a nondiscerning person.
James F. Shuey
LOUISIANA'S PROTECTION FOR RAPE VICTIMS: TOO MUCH OF
A GOOD THING?
In recognition of the problems faced by rape victims' who testify
as prosecution witnesses at trials in which evidence of their sexual
histories may be introduced, many states have enacted "rape shield
52. LA. R.S. 22:655 (Supp. 1962) states in part:
[All liability policies within their terms and limits are executed for the benefit of
all injured persons, his or her survivors or heirs, to whom the insured is liable;
and .. .it is the purpose of all liability policies to give protection and coverage to
all insured .. .for any legal liability said insured may have as or for a tort-feasor
within the the terms and limits of said policy.
1. For the sake of brevity, the term "victim" is used instead of "alleged victim"
as a synonym for prosecutrix or rape complainant. Simlarly, the term "rape" is used
instead of "alleged rape," and "offender" instead of "alleged offender." Such usage is
not intended to suggest that all rape complainants were in fact sexually assaulted. Nor
is the use of the term "prosecutrix" intended to imply that the "victim" is the pros-
ecuting party in the trial, rather than the state. Finally, although emphasis herein is
placed on the problems of female complainants at rape trials, the same basic policies,
problems, and proposed solutions should apply by analogy to male rape complainants
and, where applicable, to "victims" of other sexual offenses as well. See LA. R.S.
14:41-43.1 (Supp. 1978).
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statutes."2 These laws shield complaining witnesses from invasions
of their sexual privacy by prohibiting the admission of irrelevant
evidence of prior sexual conduct and reputation for chastity at trial.
Legislative protection of rape victims has been deemed necessary
because of the abuse and humiliation frequently suffered by them at
the hands of police, judges, and defense lawyers.'
In addition to the public policy of protecting the sexual privacy
of rape victims,' the reform of evidence laws in rape trials serves
many other valid state objectives. For example, shield laws en-
courage rape victims to report sexual crimes and later to have of-
fenders prosecuted in court. Statistics indicate that rape is one of
the most under-reported crimes.' A major factor believed responsi-
ble for this unwillingness of so many rape victims to report the
crime and have the offender brought to trial is their fear that it will
subject them to humiliating and embarrassing questions regarding
past sexual experiences Thus, more rape victims should be en-
couraged to report and prosecute offenders if they can be protected
2. For a complete list of state rape shield laws as of January, 1977, see Berger,
Man's Trial Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
32 n.196 (1977). The use of chastity evidence in rape trials has not been the only target
for reform. The substantive definition of the crime has also been undergoing amend-
ment in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., Comment, Towards A Consent Standard In The
Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 613 (1976); Note, Recent Statutory Developments in
the Definition of Forcible Rape, 61 VA. L. REV. 1500, 1509 (1975).
3. Much has been written about the many problems which rape victims face in
prosecuting their charges. The victim has often been portrayed as being on trial
herself, at the mercy of a highly prejudiced jury, and suffering from a double trauma,
all for the sake of bringing a rape charge which statistically results in acquittal in most
cases. See note 5, infra. See generally Bohmer & Blumberg, Twice Traumatized& The
Rape Victim and the Court, 58 JUDICATURE 391 (1975); Comment, Rape and Rape
Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CAL. L. REV. 919 (1973).
4. For a complete analysis of the constitutional status of the sexual "privacy"
rights of a rape victim, see Berger, supra note 2, at 41-45.
5. The conviction rate for rape is also low. For example, statistics from the
United States Department of Justice show that in 1977, arrests were made in only
53.1% of reported forcible rape cases; only 65% of these were prosecuted; and only
47% of those prosecuted were found guilty as charged. UNITED STATES DEPT OF
JUSTICE. 1977 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 14-15, 165 (1978). In other words, less than one
out of six of these reported rapes resulted in conviction as charged. See also statistics
such as those reported in B. BABCOCK. A. FREEDMAN. E. NORTON & S. ROSS, SEX
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 822-23 nn. 7-8 (1975) [hereinafter cited as B. BABCOCK].
6. See Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 335, 347-51 (1973). For an example of an especially humiliating and em-
barrassing sequence of irrelevant cross-examination questions, see B. BABCOCK, supra
note 5, at 833; Goodman, Proposed Amendments to the Criminal Code with Respect to
the Victims of Rape and Related Sexual Offenses, 6 MANITOBA L.J. 275, 276-81 (1975).
See also Comment, Judicial Attitudes Towards Rape, 57 JUDICATURE 303, 303 (1974),
where it is stated: "Victims frequently report that their encounters with the police,
District Attorneys and courtroom personnel were more traumatic than the rape inci-
dent itself."
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from the degradation of having their sexual history unnecessarily
exposed at trial through the introduction of irrelevant and embar-
rassing evidence.'
Other legitimate state aims include the prevention of unfair sur-
prise, undue delay, waste of time, and confusion of the issues at
trial, which can often result from the introduction of collateral
issues.8 By reforming the evidentiary rules, legislatures try to im-
prove the typically low conviction rate for rape' which occurs when
the jury's emotions and prejudices against an unchaste prosecutrix
are aroused. Some writers note that this bias springs from the fact
that the jury sympathizes with the offender before the trial starts."0
Also important to lawmakers is the goal of extending the unchaste
female victims the same equal protection of the law under the four-
teenth amendment enjoyed by males and chaste females. Evidence
reform is needed to correct the fact that unchaste prosecutrixes are
disproportionately discouraged from having their violaters pros-
7.
[Llimiting cross-examination of the victim of a rape or other related sexual offense
to only what is relevant and material may dispel some of the concern on the part
of the victims of these sexual assaults that they will be caused embarrassment if
they make a complaint to the authorities . . .. (Tlhis is a step in the right direc-
tion.
Goodman, supra note 6, at 281.
8. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 185, at 438-41 (2d ed. 1972); 1 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 42, at 441 (3d ed. 1940). See FED. R. EvID. 403 which provides: "Although
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." See also LA. R.S. 15:275 (Supp. 1966) ("The ... judge is vested with a sound
discretion to stop the prolonged, unnecessary and irrelevant examination of a
witness."); LA. R.S. 15:494 (1950) ("It is not competent to impeach a witness as to col-
lateral facts or irrelevant matter."). Both of the above statutes were cited in State v.
Bolder, 257 La. 60, 241 So. 2d 490 (1970), as authority for preventing defense counsel
from questioning the prosecutrix regarding her sexual relationship with a third per-
son. See note 15, infra.
9. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 14-15.
10. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249 (1966). The authors also
report that "[tlhe jury . . . scrutinizes the female complainant and is moved to be
lenient with the defendant whenever there are suggestions of contributory behavior on
her part." Id. at 249. The authors found that this partiality exists despite the fact that
the legal theories of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk technically
have no application in criminal law. Their research shows that if a jury has any
evidence from which to infer that the victim in any way "assumed the risk" of attack,
it will be inclined to acquit. It was reported that in 12% of the trials of "aggravated
rape" (defined to include those rapes in which there was evidence of extrinsic violence,
multiple assailants, or defendants and victims who were complete strangers at the
time of the event), juries acquitted where a judge would have convicted the defendant.
Astoundingly, in trials of "simple rape" (defined to include all rape cases other than
those classified as "aggravated"), this figure rose to 60%. Id. at 253.
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ecuted due to fear of exposure of their private lives and intimate
conduct."
Louisiana's attempt to reform its evidence law to meet the
needs of the victim and the state resulted in the passage of Revised
Statutes 15:498 which provides: "Evidence of prior sexual conduct
and reputation for chastity of a victim of rape or carnal knowledge
shall not be admissible except for incidents arising out of the
victim's relationship with the accused."" With the exception of prior
sexual conduct arising out of a victim's relationship with the accused
himself, the new Louisiana law appears to prohibit the admission of
any defense evidence relating to the prior sexual history of the com-
plaining witness, regardless of whether it relates to the victim's
general reputation or to specific sexual conduct.
The new shield law partially overrules more than half a century
of jurisprudence. Formerly, Louisiana courts had admitted substan-
tive evidence of a rape complainant's general general reputation for
chastity when consent was put at issue by the defendant and the
evidence tended to show that the victim consented to the sexual in-
tercourse at issue." Specific acts of sexual conduct were never ad-
11. For a complete analysis of the constitutional status of equal protection rights
of the rape victim, see Berger, supra note 2, at 45. One author has suggested that
allowing the use of evidence of prior sexual conduct to impeach female complainants in
rape cases, while disallowing its use to impeach males, is a denial of equal protection.
Comment, Rape in Illinois: A Denial of Equal Protection, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC.
457 (1975). "[Tlhe test of equal protection is simply that all must freely enjoy equal op-
portunities and obligations under the law unless the reasonable classification of groups
in furtherance of a valid state interest dictates otherwise." Comment, supra, at 477.
Another author has noted that the practical effect of admitting irrelevant evidence of
sexual conduct in rape trials "places significant numbers of women, rather than a few
outcasts, beyond the protection of the law." Comment, supra note 3, at 939.
"(Slexual activity outside marriage is so widespread that it provides no basis for in-
ferring sexual conduct in a specific instance." Ordover, Admissibility of Patterns of
Similar Sexual Conduct: The Unlamented Death of Character for Chastity, 63 COR-
NELL L. REV. 90, 102 (1977).
12. 1975 La. Acts, No. 732, adding LA. R.S. 15:498. Instrumental in the passage of
Louisiana's new rape shield law were the arguments and supporting evidence provided
by representatives from the Bureau of Status of Women, the Governor's Commission
of Status of Women, and the National Council of Jewish Women. Minutes, Hearings on
H.B. 619 Before House Comm. on Judiciary, Section D Meeting, May 28, 1975, 1st
Reg. Sess. (1975).
13. See, e.g., State v. Jack, 285 So. 2d 204, 208 (La. 1973) ("Evidence of the [rape]
victim's general reputation for chastity is admissible [only] when consent is put at
issue by the defendant."); State v. Borde, 209 La. 905, 910, 25 So. 2d 736, 738 (1946) ("It
is the universally recognized rule of evidence that [substantive] ... evidence as to the
chastity of the prosecuting witness in rape cases is never admissible except to impeach
her when consent is pleaded as a defense by showing the probability of her consent.");
State v. Perrine, 156 La. 855, 101 So. 243 (1924) ("When [consent] is the issue, in a pros-
ecution for . . . rape .... evidence of the previous unchaste character of the woman is
relevant.").
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missible, unless they occurred between the prosecutrix and the
defendant,"' nor was evidence of prior sexual history admissible for
purposes of impeachment." Thus, read strictly, the recent legislative
exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction of evidence which was
formerly admissible (ise., evidence of the complainant's general
reputation for chastity in cases where consent had been put at issue
as a defense).
Despite the fact that evidence reform is a laudable goal, the ad-
missibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct has long been an
issue of debate among legal scholars."6  Notwithstanding its
legitimate purposes, a shield statute may conflict with the constitu-
tional rights of the accused. The sixth amendment demands that the
defendant be given the opportunity to present evidence and
witnesses on his own behalf, as well as to cross-examine the
witnesses against him.
These basic principles were expounded and given landmark in-
terpretations in the two recent United States Supreme Court cases
of Chambers v. Mississippi" and Davis v. Alaska 8 Chambers dealt
with a defendant's constitutional right to introduce exculpatory
evidence on his behalf in order to make out his defense against the
state's accusations. The Court reversed Chambers' conviction for
murder because the trial court's strict application of two Mississippi
evidence rules had effectively denied the defendant his due process
14. State v. Broussard, 217 La. 90, 95-96, 46 So. 2d 48, 50-51 (1950).
[Although it has been] generally held that a defendant should be allowed to prove
prior acts of sexual intercourse between the prosecutrix and himself .. . . it has
been definitely settled in this state that, in trials of rape, evidence is not admissi-
ble to prove specific acts of intercourse by the prosecutrix with other men.
217 La. at 95-96, 46 So. 2d at 50-51. See State v. Jack, 285 So. 2d 204, 208 (La. 1973)
("Though such general reputation evidence may be admissible, specific acts of im-
morality cannot be shown.").
15. In State v. Bolden, 257 La. 60, 241 So. 2d 490 (1970), it is stated:
[Ilt is not competent to impeach a witness as to collateral facts or irrelevant mat-
ter (R.S. 15:494).
Obviously, the purpose of counsel's question ["Did you ever live common law
with a man named Mustang?"] was to impeach the witness by an attack on her
chastity. This is not proper. It is well settled that in rape cases, the chastity or
lack of chastity . . .of the victim is not admissible for the purpose of impeaching
credibility.
Id at 63, 241 So. 2d at 491.
16. Dean Wigmore once declared that "no question of evidence has been more con-
troverted." J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 200, at 682.
17. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
18. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
19. The common law "voucher rule" followed by Mississippi prohibited any party
from discrediting the testimony of its own witnesses. Under this rule, Chambers was
prevented from calling and cross-examining as a defense witness Gable McDonald, a
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rights." Because the trial court had excluded highly reliable and
relevant evidence which was "critical" to Chambers' defense, the
Court held that Chambers had been deprived of a fair trial."
In Davis, the Supreme Court concerned itself with the constitu-
tional rights of a defendant under the confrontation clause. The
Court reversed Davis' convictions for burglary and grand larceny
because the trial court, relying upon a juvenile shield law,22 had
prevented him from effectively impeaching the credibility of a
"crucial" state witness. 8
In light of Chambers and Davis, exclusionary rules cannot be
mechanistically applied to deny admission of highly reliable and rele-
vant evidence which is "critical" to an accused's rape defense.
man who had himself confessed to the murder at issue and whose testimony was
therefore critical to Chambers' defense that someone else, rather than Chambers, had
committed the murder. Because the state did not call McDonald as a witness, and since
the trial court had refused to allow Chambers to examine him as an "adverse witness,"
even after McDonald repudiated his confession, McDonald remained immune from full
cross-examination and impeachment. Since Mississippi's evidence rules did not provide
for a declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule, three other
defense witnesses were not permitted to testify that McDonald had admitted his guilt
to them in separate private conversations. The Court therefore concluded that the
Mississippi voucher and hearsay rules had been applied unconstitutionally in
Chambers' case. 410 U.S. at 302.
20. Id.
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right
to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations. The rights to con-
front and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have
long been recognized as essential to due process.
Id. at 294, citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
21. 410 U.S. at 302-03. "The testimony rejected by the trial court here bore per-
suasive assurances of trustworthiness . . . . That testimony was also critical to
Chambers' defense. . . . We conclude that the exclusion of this critical evidence . . .
denied him a trial in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due
process." Id. at 302.
22. Juvenile shield laws are analogous to rape shield laws insofar as they shield a
witness from the embarrassment of having prior juvenile adjudications disclosed in
court by prohibiting the introduction of such adjudications in evidence at trial. The
state's interests in guarding the anonymity of juvenile offenders are the protection of
the juvenile and his family from the embarrassment of having his juvenile adjudica-
tions disclosed in open court and the encouragement of rehabilitation by protecting
juvenile offenders against loss of future employment opportunities or other disadvan-
tages which might otherwise be imposed upon them for their "youthful transgression."
415 U.S. at 319. However, the Davis Court concluded that "[tihe State's policy interest
in protecting ... confidentiality ... cannot require [the] yielding of so vital a constitu-
tional right as the effective cross-examination for bias of [a crucial] adverse witness."
Id at 320.
23. The defendant had sought to reveal the "possible biases, prejudices or ulterior
motives of [a] witness," by showing that, because of his juvenile probationary status,
he was "subject to undue pressure from the police and had made his identifications
under fear of possible probation revocation." Id, at 311, 316.
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However, it is difficult to determine the precise extent to which the
Constitution may restrict the application of exclusionary rules in
less compelling cases."' The holdings of the Chambers-Davis line of
cases are all very narrowly drawn, making it difficult to define a
clear constitutional standard of admissibility.25 Nevertheless, despite
the difficulty of extrapolating from these narrow holdings, the deci-
sions reached in these cases appear to be based on the premise that
the defendant's sixth amendment rights are fundamental-but sub-
ject to being outweighed by competing governmental interests."
Although these cases "almost totally fail to provide any ... con-
sistent test"" for establishing when the Constitution compels the ad-
mission of evidence, the case language strongly implies the use of a
"balancing of interests" approach to reconcile the competing in-
terests involved. 8 The cases presume that the exclusionary rules
sought to be enforced by the state promote valid governmental in-
terests. The constitutional issue then focuses upon fairness to the
defendant. The value of the evidence sought to be admitted by the
defendant is weighed in terms of its relevancy, reliability, and im-
portance to determine whether, despite the governmental interests
24. Rape shield laws are based on the primary rationale that evidence of the com-
plainant's prior sexual history is irrelevant in most cases to the issues presented at
rape trials. However, if such evidence does become relevant in a particular situation,
its exclusion could cause constitutional problems. See Westen, The Compulsory Pro-
cess Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 150 n.382 (1974) ("State (and federal) standards of
materiality and relevance could conflict with compulsory process if redefined so nar-
rowly as to prevent the defendant from introducing probative evidence 'in his favor'
that might influence the outcome of the trial.").
25. Westen, supra note 24, at 151. See Clinton, The Right to Present A Defense:
An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 713, 792-96
(1976). Clinton has described the decisions as "idiosyncratic reactions to manifest in-
justices" and has lamented the Court's failure to develop an analytical test which could
regulate the application of exclusionary rules. Clinton, supra, at 795-96.
26. Clinton, supra note 25, at 793. In a sub-section entitled "Beyond Chambers: In
Search of a Standard of Review," Clinton submits that since the Court has classified
the right to defend oneself as a "fundamental right," this implies, according to tradi-
tional constitutional principles, that a compelling or legitimate governmental interest
test must be applied before such a right can be denied by the State. Id at 798. Subse-
quent cases have utilized language consistent with the balancing approach. See, e.g.,
United States v. Booker, 480 F.2d 1310, 1311 (7th Cir. 1973) ("[Tlechnical rules [of
evidence] ...are clearly less significant than fundamental rights of fairness.").
27. Clinton, supra note 25, at 795.
28. See, e.g., 415 U.S. at 319 ("[Tihe State ... interest in protecting the anonymity
of juvenile offenders .. .is outweighed by petitioner's right to probe into the influence
of possible bias in the testimony of a crucial identification witness." (Emphasis added.));
410 U.S. at 295 ("Of course, the right to confront and cross-examine is not absolute and
may in appropriate cases bow to accommodate other legitimate [governmental] in-
terests . . . .But its denial ... requires that the competing interest be closely ex-
amined." (Emphasis added.)).
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involved, the Constitution mandates admission. Using this approach,
if evidence which is sought to be admitted by a defendant is rele-
vant and reliable, and particularly if it is sufficiently important so as
to be "critical" ' or "crucial""0 or "vital,""1 then the Constitution will
require its admission regardless of an existing shield statute.2
Evidence of a complainant's sexual conduct and reputation for
chastity will normally be irrelevant, both for substantive and im-
peachment purposes, to the issues considered at rape trials." The
mere fact that a prosecutrix is unchaste usually is not pertinent to
the inquiry of whether the defendant forced her to engage in sexual
intercourse.3 Likewise, chastity per se has little or no relevance as a
29. 410 U.S. at 302.
30. 415 U.S. at 317, 319.
31. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16 (1967).
32. "[Tlhe defendant's right to a fair trial must be given precedence over the
alleged victim's right to privacy." 2 J. WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE, UNITED STATES RULES
411-12 (1978).
When the defendant offers critical evidence in his favor as part of his sixth
amendment right to present a defense, . . . the prosecution has a constitutional
obligation to present some good reason for excluding exculpatory evidence. The
prosecutor .. .must demonstrate that exclusion is necessary to further a compel-
ling state interest.
Westen, supra note 24, at 156. The Supreme Court has indicated that privacy protec-
tion does not qualify as a "compelling state interest" sufficient to justify the exclusion
of such evidence. "[W]e conclude that the right of confrontation is paramount to the
State's policy of protecting the privacy of a juvenile offender." 415 U.S. at 319 (em-
phasis added).
33. In California v. Blackburr, 56 Cal. App. 3d 685, 128 Cal. Rtpr. 864 (1978), the
court stated: "The relevance of past sexual conduct of the alleged victim of the rape
with persons other than the defendant to the issue of her consent to a particular act of
sexual intercourse with the defendant is slight at best." Id. at 690, 128 Cal. Rptr. at
867.
34. Cf. Ordover, supra note 11, at 97 ("[Tlhe traditional rule (ie., that an unchaste
character trait is predictive of present consent) is wrong. It proceeds from a faulty
premise (i.e., that all non-marital intercourse is abnormal, immoral, reprehensible and
uncondoned by contemporary society) and contravenes principles and policies long em-
bodied in the law of evidence."); Comment, If She Consented Once, She Consented
Again-A Legal Fallacy in Forcible Rape Cases, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 127, 138 (1976)
("[Tihe victim's lack of chastity has little, if any, probative value on the issue of con-
sent."); Comment, The Rape Victim: A Victim of Society and the Law, 11 WILLAMETTE
L.J. 36, 54 (1974) ("[A] victim's reputation and sexual activities with men other than
her assailant are irrelevant."); Note, supra note 6, at 343 ("The concentration upon the
reputation of the prosecutrix, almost as if she were the one whose guilt or innocence
were to be determined, is an indication of the bias against the rape victim in the cur-
rent system."). See also Comment, Limitations on the Right to Introduce Evidence
Pertaining to the Prior Sexual History of the Complaining Witness in Cases of Forci-
ble Rape: Reflection of Reality or Denial of Due Process?, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 403, 414
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Limitations] ("[This] antiquated, victorian concept of women
... bears no relation to the reality of today.").
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factor in judging the "credibility" of the prosecutrix as a truthful
witness, nor is this factor a reliable indication of a victim's motiva-
tion to "frame" the defendant. 5
However, factual situations could arise which would qualify as
exceptions to the general rule. For instance, Louisiana's own statute
recognizes the relevance of past sexual relationships between the
victim and the accused." Evidence that the victim has voluntarily
engaged in sexual intercourse with the defendant is deemed to have
strong probative value insofar as it concerns the issue of her con-
sent to the sex act in question. 7 Another example would be the case
of a rape complainant who engages in an established pattern of in-
discriminate sex as a prostitute." In such a case, evidence of the
prior sexual conduct of the complainant may be extremely relevant
to a defense of consent"' or a reasonable belief of consent."0 Evidence
35. See Note, Florida's Sexual Battery Statute: Significant Reform But Bias
Against the Victim Still Prevails, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 419 (1978). The author states:
The Davis court concluded that the defense was entitled to show that the witness
was biased because of his vulnerable status as a probationer and his concern that
he might be a suspect in the burglary charged against the defendant. No parallel
exists in the case of sexual battery; prior sexual activity indicates neither bias
nor involvement in crime.
Id. at 442.
36. LA. R.S. 15:498 (Supp. 1975). See statute as reproduced in text at note 12,
supra.
37. However, there is an inverse relationship between the remoteness in time of
voluntary consent previously given by the victim and its relevancy to the present
issue of consent. In other words, the more distant in time the earlier consent was
given, the less likely it is that the consent continued to exist at the time of the act in
question. Thus, under ordinary circumstances, the fact that the victim once had a sex-
ual relationship with the accused in the remote past has very little relevance to the
issue of whether a current voluntary relationship existed.
38. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978
Term-Evidencei 39 LA. L. REV. 955, 956 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Evidence].
39. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 406, which provides: "Evidence of the habit of a person ... is
relevant to prove that the conduct of the person ... on a particular occasion was in
conformity with the habit." The Advisory Committee's note following the rule cites
Professor C. McCormick as the basis for the statement that "agreement is general that
habit evidence is highly persuasive as proof of conduct on a particular occasion." FED.
R. EVID. 406, comment.
Note, however, that even the routine practice of prostitution would probably not
qualify as "habit," which is restricted in its technical definition to "semi-automatic"
conduct performed without conscious thought, i.e., "[a non-volitional] regular response
to a repeated specific situation." C. MCCORMICK. supra note 8, § 195, at 462.
40. Evidence that the defendant had a reasonable belief that the complainant con-
sented to the conduct at issue will be relevant in most prosecutions for rape and sex-
ual battery in order to show that the complainant in fact consented. Lack of consent on
the part of the victim is an essential element of these crimes, except in cases of sexual
offenses committed upon minors. In the latter cases, express statutory language pro-
vides that lack of knowledge of the victim's age shall not be a defense. Thus, not only
is evidence of a reasonable belief of consent irrelevant, but also evidence of actual con-
sent is irrelevant. LA. R.S. 14:42(3) & 14:80 (Supp. 1978); LA. R.S. 14:81-81.1 (Supp.
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of prior sexual conduct may also be highly relevant where the cir-
cumstances of the previous conduct are so distinctive and so closely
resemble the defendant's version of the alleged encounter with the
complainant that the evidence could be classified as "modus oper-
andi."" Additionally, if the accused wishes to defend on the basis of
evidence that some other person is responsible for the complainant's
abused condition, then evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct
which occurred near the time in question would be relevant to
establish the origin of semen, pregnancy, disease or injury allegedly
arising from the rape.
For purposes of impeachment, evidence of a victim's sexual con-
duct with men other than the defendant is relevant if it tends to
show that the testimony of an adverse witness is unreliable or non-
trustworthy. For instance, in Minnesota v. Elijah," the defendant
unsuccessfully sought to establish the bias and to impeach the
credibility of a witness who testified as a friend of the victim by
showing that the couple had engaged in sexual intercourse and had
generally been on most intimate terms. The evidence would have
supported an inference that the witness's sexual involvement with
the victim led him to harbor a deep-seated jealousy against the ac-
cused. The defendant's subsequent carnal knowledge conviction was
1977). However, in other cases of rape which require proof of lack of consent of the vic-
tim, the reasonableness of the defendant's belief of consent is probative of the complain-
ant's actual consent to the conduct in issue, since consent is an issue of fact.
Furthermore, under Revised Statutes 14:16, evidence that the defendant
reasonably believed that the complainant consented to the conduct in issue would also
be relevant as the basis of a reasonable "mistake of fact" defense in cases where the
offense requires a mental element. For example, the Louisiana statute defining sexual
battery expressly requires that the offensive conduct be "intentional." LA. R.S. 14:43.1
(Supp. 1978). It is submitted that, despite the absence of any express intent require-
ment in the statutes defining aggravated, forcible, and simple rape, a mens rea re-
quirement nevertheless exists for these crimes, under which a defendant must have a
general intent to commit the offense (i.e., to engage in prohibited non-consensual inter-
course). See State v. Fletcher, 341 So. 2d 340, 343 (La. 1976) (finding that, in light of all
the evidence, defendant was not justified by any reasonable mistake of fact to conclude
that the victim consented to the conduct in issue); The Work of the Louisiana Ap-
pellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term-Criminal Law, 39 LA. L. REV. 771, 782 (1979).
41. Louisiana provides for the admission of evidence of "other crimes" committed
by a defendant if the prior misconduct was of such a distinctive character that it
becomes relevant in proving the identity of the perpetrator of the present crime. See
LA. R.S. 15:445 (1950) which provides: "In order to show intent, evidence is admissible
of similar acts, independent of the act charged as a crime in the indictment, for though
intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact, it may be inferred from the
circumstances of the transaction." An analogy can be drawn between such "signature
crimes" previously committed by a defendant which are admitted to show intent and
distinctive past sexual behavior on the part of a prosecutrix which could be relevant to
show voluntariness (or consent) with respect to the sex act in issue.
42. 206 Minn. 619, 289 N.W. 575 (1940).
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reversed because his attempt at cross-examination had been un-
constitutionally curtailed.
Evidence of the complainant's sexual conduct will also be rele-
vant for impeachment purposes in cases where the defendant seeks
to introduce it in support of expert psychological or psychiatric opin-
ion that the complainant fantasized or invented the act or acts
charged.'" Some courts and commentators" have expressed concern
that many sexual offense accusations are made by "psychologically
disturbed individuals";"5 therefore such evidence, where relevant
and reliable, should be admitted in order to protect the falsely ac-
cused. Evidence of prior sexual conduct would also be relevant to
impeach a victim who has, on direct examination, made a material
misrepresentation as to the nature of her sexual experience on occa-
sions other than that of the alleged rape. Under these cir-
cumstances, the defendant should be allowed to "confront" the
witness by introducing reliable evidence of any prior inconsistent
statement or prior inconsistent conduct, even if this evidence in-
volves prior sexual history. Thus, in situations similar to the above
examples, the exclusion of relevant and reliable defense evidence,
especially if "critical" to an accused's defense, could constitute a
denial of constitutional guarantees.46
Many states"7 and Congress'8 have endeavored to draft rape
43. See generally Comment, Complainant Credibility in Sexual Offense Cases: A
Survey of Character Testimony and Psychiatric Experts, 64 J. CRIM. L. 67 (1973).
44. Id. at 67 nn.2-3.
45. Id. at 67.
46. See notes 17-31, supra, and accompanying text.
47. For an analysis and categorization of the most common provisions contained in
the majority of such legislation, see Berger, supra note 2, at 100-03. For example, of
the twenty-eight state rape shield statutes in force as of 1977, twenty-three contain
protective procedural provisions requiring the defendant to seek the judge's permis-
sion before introducing chastity evidence at trial. Eleven of these explicitly require the
defendant to make an offer of proof of relevance to the judge, and almost all of the
statutes provide for mandatory or discretionary preliminary hearings, to be held out-
side the hearing of the jury. Id.
48. See Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-540, §
2(a), 92 Stat. 2046 (1978), adding FED. R. EVID. 412 (governing the admissibility at trial
of chastity evidence of a complainant's past sexual behavior). The new federal legisla-
tion attempts to balance the competing interests of the prosecution and the accused by
providing for the admission, after a relevancy hearing in chambers, of the following
evidence (other than reputation or opinion evidence) when the defendent has filed writ-
ten motion to offer such evidence, accompanied by a written offer of proof containing
one or more of the following:
(1) evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior which is constitutionally required
to be admitted; or
(2) evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior with persons other than the ac-
cused to show the source of semen or injury; or
(3) evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior with the accused and offered by
him upon the issue of consent.
NOTES
shield statutes which recognize the delicacy of balancing opposing
interests "in such a way as to dignify the complainant's role without
imperiling the person accused." 9 By incorporating provisions for
flexibility and discretion into the shield laws, allowance has been
made for the admission of highly relevant defense evidence which is
likely to be "critical" in cases where it would otherwise be excluded.
Early experience in the application of some recently drafted
rape shield laws indicates that the exclusion of evidence, of prior
sexual conduct may cause constitutional problems unless the judge
has discretion to admit reliable and probative, but otherwise inad-
missible, evidence when it is critically relevant to the accused's
defense. For instance, the New York statute,"0 a much more detailed
and narrowly-drawn statute than Louisiana's, was recently threatened
by a constitutional challenge in the case of New York v. Conyers."
Citing Davis, the New York Supreme Court held that "but for" the
statute's omnibus clause, which allowed the court discretion to ad-
mit evidence of the victim's sexual conduct, the statute would have
serious constitutional problems.2
A successful constitutional attack on the exclusion of similar
evidence in a sex offense trial resulted in a reversal of a carnal
knowledge conviction in Maryland v. DeLawder. Because of a
jurisprudential rule excluding evidence of prior sexual conduct in
prosecutions for carnal knowledge of a juvenile-under the rationale
that such females were legally incapable of consenting to sexual in-
tercourse-the defendant in DeLawder had not been permitted to
introduce evidence relating to prior acts of sexual intercourse by
the prosecutrix with other men. The defendant had made an
elaborate offer of proof indicating that the alleged victim had accused
49. Berger, supra note 2, at 100.
50. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1975) provides:
Evidence of a victim's sexual conduct shall not be admissible in a prosecution for
[rape] unless such evidence: (1) proves or tends to prove specific instances of the
victim's prior sexual conduct with the accused; or (2) proves or tends to prove
that the victim has been convicted of [prostitution] within 3 years prior to the
[date of the alleged rape]; or (3) rebuts [prosecution] evidence of the victim's
failure to engage in sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or sexual con-
tact during a given-period of time; or (4) rebuts [prosecution] evidence which proves
or tends to prove that the accused is the cause of the pregnancy or disease of the
victim, or the source of semen found in the victim; or (5) is determined by the
court after an offer of proof by the accused outside the hearing of the jury ... to
be relevant and admissible in the interests of justice.
51. 382 N.Y.S.2d 437, 86 Misc. 2d 754 (1976).
52. Id. at 444, 86 Misc. 2d at 763. The New York Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's exclusion of the evidence because the defendant had not put consent at issue,
but merely wished to impeach the general credibility of the prosecutrix by offering her
record as a prostitute.
53. 28 Md. App. 212, 344 A.2d 446 (1975).
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him of rape only because she believed she was pregnant by another
man and was afraid 'to tell her mother that she had had voluntary
sexual intercourse with others. On the strength of Davis, the court
held that the exclusionary rule had been unconstitutionally applied
to prevent the defendant from effectively exposing the possible bias,
prejudice, and ulterior motive of the prosecutrix.
Another reversal of a sex offense conviction came as a result of
an attack on the constitutionality of a 1975 amendment to an Oregon
statute" which limited the admissibility of evidence of past sexual
conduct of rape victim. In Oregon v. Jalo," the Oregon appellate
court held that the application of the Oregon rape shield statute in
that case infringed upon the defendant's constitutional right to con-
frontation because the statute resulted in the exclusion of reliable
evidence of the complainant's ulterior motive."
The Louisiana Supreme Court has on two occasions considered
the constitutionality of the new Louisiana law, but in neither case
was the validity of the shield law disturbed. In State v. Domangue,57
the defendant did not demonstrate that the excluded evidence of the
victim's prior sexual history was relevant to the issues at trial. In
State v. Decuir," the court also found that the defendant had not
shown any correlation between the excluded evidence of the com-
plainant's prior sexual conduct and the instant charge, nor had he
shown that the earlier conduct suggested any motive on the part of
the prosecutrix to fabricate." However, Justice Dennis in a concur-
54. OR. REV. STAT. § 163,475 (1975). The particular section of the statute at issue
was section three, which provided that "evidence of previous sexual conduct of a com-
plainant is presumed to be irrelevant and shall not be admitted .... This presumption
may be overcome." The Oregon statute contained provisions for a preliminary hearing,
at which the relevancy and subsequent admissibility of the proffered evidence was
determined.
55. 27 Or. App. 845, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976).
56. Id. at 850-51, 557 P.2d at 1362. The court noted:
The charges arose when the 10-year-old complainant reported that the 41-year-old
defendant had engaged in and attempted various sexual acts with her. Defendant
denied this, contending he had discovered that the girl had engaged in sexual con-
duct with his 13-year-old son, another young boy and her uncle, had told her he
would inform her parents, and that before he did so she falsely accused him of the
crimes charged.
Id at 847, 557 P.2d at 1360.
57. 350 So. 2d 599 (La. 1977).
58. 364 So. 2d 946 (La. 1978).
59. Id at 948. The Decuir court concluded:
In view of our finding that the evidence sought to be elicited was not competent
to impeach the witness because of its irrelevancy and was therefore inadmissible,
we need not consider the applicability of La. R.S. 15:498 where the evidence of
prior sexual conduct of a rape victim is in fact relevant to establish bias, interest
or corruption on the part of the witness.
Id (Emphasis added.)
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ring opinion cautioned that "this case has exposed an infirmity of
constitutional dimensions in .. . La. R.S. 15:498"'60 and anticipated
that in future cases exclusion of genuinely relevant evidence might
overreach its legitimate aims and violate the accused's right to a
fair trial."'
Viewed in light of the aforementioned jurisprudence," the
language of Louisiana's rape shield law" appears to set forth an in-
flexible, overly-protective rule which is not attuned to the legitimate
needs of an accused" and therefore is almost certain to be attacked
by defendants who are frustrated in their attempts to present rele-
vant evidence critical to their defense. As indicated above, if the
broad language of the new law is relied upon to exclude important,
relevant, and trustworthy defense evidence of prior sexual conduct,
then the new statute may well be unconstitutional as applied.
In order to avoid constitutional infirmity 5 and the concomitant
danger of conviction reversals, while continuing to provide effective
privacy protection for victims of sexual offenses, Revised Statutes
15:498 should be amended. The proposed statute suggested below is
a composite of two model rape shield laws drafted by authorities on
this subject,"6 and is similar in form to the federal shield statute. 7
60. 364 So. 2d at 948 (Dennis, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 949, citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
The ultimate question is one of relevancy, and it cannot be reasonably determined
by an inflexible rule having no regard for the facts of a particular case. Rather,
the decision whether to admit evidence ... should be consigned to the trial judge
who can delicately weigh the competing interests of complainant and defendant.
Id at 949.
62. See notes 17-32, 42, 51-61, supra, and accompanying text.
63. LA. R.S. 15:498 (Supp. 1975). The statute is reproduced in text at note 12,
supra.
64. In one aspect, the Louisiana statute may be inadvertently under-protective of
the victim and overprotective of the defendant insofar as it mandates admission, in all
cases, of evidence of prior sexual relationships between them, even in cases where the
relationship was remote in time. See note 37, supra.
65. See text at notes 51-61, supra. For examples of constitutional criticisms of
rape shield statutes, see Berger, supra note 2, at 69-87; Herman, What's Wrong With
Rape Reform?, Civ. LIB. REV., Dec. 1976/Jan. 1977, at 60; Rudstein, Rape Shield Laws:
Some Constitutional Problems, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 14-45 (1976); Limitations,
supra note 34, at 419-25; Comment, The Kentucky Rape Shield Law: One Step Too
Far, 66 Ky. L.J. 426 (1977); Note, Indiana's Rape Sheild Law: Conflict With the Con-
frontation Clause?, 9 IND. L. REV. 418 (1976).
66. See B. BABCOCK, supra note 5, at 840-42; Berger, supra note 2, at 97-99.
67. See note 48, supra Since Louisiana evidence law substantially coincides with
most 'of the other provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence, it would be consistent
for the legislature to adopt a statute similar in form to this most recent enactment.
For a student symposium comparing Louisiana evidence law with the Federal Rules of
Evidence, see Symposium-Federal Rules of Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 59 (1975).
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The models provide a detailed, workable solution to the constitu-
tional problems encountered in drafting an effective shield statute.
The proposed statute makes evidence of a victim's sexual history
generally inadmissible, except in cases where (1) the evidence falls
within one of the excepted categories and (2) the court determines
that it is relevant to a material fact and that its probative value is
not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The statute,
however, is explicitly made subject to constitutional limitations;
therefore, if the Constitution compels the admission of reliable, rele-
vant evidence, the fact that such evidence does not fall within one of
the excepted categories will not render it inadmissible. Thus, the
proposed statute protects both the constitutional rights of defen-
dants and the privacy interests of complainants.
Text of Proposed Statute
Subject to constitutional limitations, in prosecutions for rape, at-
tempted rape, and other sexual offenses, the defendant may not in-
troduce reputation or opinion evidence or evidence of 'specific in-
stances of the complainant's sexual conduct except:
Upon written motion of the defendant to offer such evidence, ac-
companied by a written offer of proof of relevance, the following
evidence shall be admissible if the court, after hearing the proffered
evidence in an in camera hearing," finds that it is relevant to a
material fact and that its probative value is not outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or unwarranted
invasion of the complainant's privacy:
68. When Revised Statutes 15:498, then House Bill 619, was passed by the House
on July 3, 1975, it concluded with the following provisions: "However, such evidence
may be received by the judge in chambers. If the judge determines the evidence to be
relevant and material, it may be introduced in open court, subject to the rules of
evidence." OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, 1st Reg. Sess. at 49 (July 3, 1975). Before reporting the bill,
the Senate Committee on Judiciary "B" amended the above provision to delete the
word "chambers" and inserted in lieu thereof the phrase "open court out of the
presence of the jury." OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE
STATE OF LOUISIANA, 1st Reg. Sess. at 11 (July 10, 1975). The Senate committee had
feared that the in camera hearing would interfere with the defendant's right to a
"public trial" guaranteed by the sixth amendment of the Constitution. Therefore, prior
to passage of the bill in the Senate on July 14, 1975, the entire provision was deleted.
However, in camera hearings are frequently used in criminal trials to determine
issues of admissibility of evidence, and the appropriateness of holding such non-public
hearings to screen evidence of a complainant's past sexual conduct is recognized in the
federal shield statute. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(2). Louisiana jurisprudence has also
acknowledged the use of in camera hearings in criminal trials to protect privacy in-
terests of third persons. See, e.g., State v. Babin, 319 So. 2d 367, 374 (1975). Cf.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 689 (1974). (holding that an in camera inspection of
disputed evidence would meet the needs of the judicial process in securing relevant
evidence without significantly diminishing the privacy interests of the defendant).
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(1) Evidence of prior sexual conduct or consensual sexual inter-
course between the complainant and the defendant which
tends to prove that the complainant consented to the con-
duct in issue.
(2) Evidence of an established pattern of prior sexual conduct
on the part of the complainant which tends to prove that
the complainant consented to the conduct in issue or such
evidence, if known to the defendant at the time of the act or
acts charged, which tends to prove that the defendant reason-
ably believed that the complainant was consenting.
(3) Evidence of prior sexual conduct on the part of the complain-
ant so distinctive and so closely resembling the defendant's
version of the alleged encounter with the complainant as to
tend to prove that she consented to the conduct in issue.
(4) Evidence of prior sexual conduct on the part of the complain-
ant which tends to prove that a person other than the
defendant committed the act or acts charged or caused the
complainant's physical condition allegedly arising from
these acts. Such evidence shall include proof of the origin of
semen, pregnancy, disease or injury allegedly resulting from
these acts.
(5) Evidence of sexual conduct on the part of the complainant
which tends to prove that the complaint has a motive for
fabricating the charge or charges made.
(6) Evidence of sexual conduct on the part of the complainant
offered as the basis of expert psychological or psychiatric
opinion that the complainant fantasized or invented the act
or acts charged.
(7) Evidence of prior sexual conduct on the part of the complain-
ant which tends to show that the complaining witness has,
on direct examination, made a material misrepresentation
as to the nature of her sexual experience on occasions other
than that of the alleged offense.
Lora C. Sykora
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